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Abstract	  	  The	  effect	  of	  reward	  on	  cognitive	  control	  has	  been	  a	  topic	  of	  exponentially	  increasing	  interest	  and	  this	  spawned	  an	  impressive	  amount	  of	  empirical	  findings.	  Inspired	  by	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  Berridge	  and	  Robinson	  (2003),	  we	  propose	  that	  the	  variability	  in	  observations	  can	  be	  framed	  by	  dissociating	  different	  reward	  components.	  Similarly,	  as	  cognitive	  control	  is	  an	  equally	  multifaceted	  construct,	  we	  believe	  it	  is	  important	  to	  differentiate	  certain	  forms	  of	  cognitive	  control	  behavior.	  In	  pairing	  reward	  components	  to	  particular	  forms	  of	  cognitive	  control,	  we	  propose	  that	  the	  hedonic	  aspect	  of	  reward	  promotes	  explorative	  behavior,	  the	  learning	  component	  of	  reward	  induces	  exploitative	  behavior,	  and	  the	  motivational	  component	  of	  reward	  engages	  anticipatory	  behavior.	  We	  discuss	  the	  available	  literature	  in	  light	  of	  this	  proposition	  and	  present	  some	  guidelines	  on	  how	  to	  dissociate	  these	  different	  components	  of	  reward	  and	  cognitive	  control.	  	  
	  	  Introduction	  	  Understanding	  how	  reward	  modulates	  human	  behavior	  and	  information	  processing	  has	  been	  a	  core	  challenge	  for	  psychologists	  for	  decades.	  In	  recent	  years	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  studies	  started	  to	  investigate	  the	  effects	  of	  reward	  on	  cognitive	  control	  as	  well.	  These	  studies	  demonstrated	  that	  reward	  modulates	  task	  switching,	  conflict	  adaptation,	  response	  inhibition,	  memory,	  visual	  search,	  proactive	  control,	  and	  so	  on.	  However,	  the	  direction	  of	  these	  results	  remains	  ambiguous.	  While	  most	  of	  these	  studies	  demonstrate	  performance	  benefits	  following	  reward,	  other	  studies	  have	  showed	  detrimental	  effects	  of	  reward	  on	  information	  processing.	  For	  instance,	  Hickey,	  Chelazzi	  and	  Theeuwes	  (2010)	  showed	  that	  rewarded	  stimulus	  features	  capture	  attention	  even	  when	  counterproductive.	  Moreover,	  contradictory	  reward-­‐based	  modulations	  have	  been	  described.	  For	  instance,	  while	  Braem,	  Verguts,	  Roggeman,	  and	  Notebaert	  (2012)	  observed	  increased	  conflict	  adaptation	  (see	  also	  Braem,	  Hickey,	  Duthoo,	  &	  Notebaert,	  in	  press;	  Stürmer,	  Nigbur,	  Schacht,	  &	  Sommer,	  2011),	  van	  Steenbergen,	  Band,	  and	  Hommel	  (2009,	  2012)	  observed	  decreased	  conflict	  adaptation	  following	  reward.	  It	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  we	  are	  currently	  in	  need	  for	  a	  new	  framework;	  a	  point	  that	  has	  also	  been	  raised	  in	  recent	  review	  articles	  by	  Chiew	  and	  Braver	  (2011)	  and	  Dreisbach	  and	  Fischer	  (2012).	  In	  this	  chapter,	  we	  provide	  such	  a	  framework	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  proposition	  by	  Berridge	  and	  Robinson	  (2003).	  	  A	  decade	  ago,	  Berridge	  and	  Robinson	  (2003)	  proposed	  parsing	  reward	  into	  three	  different	  components:	  a	  hedonic,	  a	  motivational,	  and	  a	  learning	  component.	  The	  affective	  or	  hedonic	  component	  of	  reward	  refers	  to	  the	  general	  positive	  feeling	  people	  experience	  when	  they	  receive	  reward.	  The	  motivational	  component	  of	  reward	  relates	  to	  increased	  (cognitive)	  effort	  people	  display	  when	  reward	  is	  promised	  for	  good	  performance.	  The	  learning	  component	  of	  reward	  refers	  to	  what	  learning	  psychologists	  call	  reinforcement.	  It	  results	  in	  an	  increased	  likelihood	  of	  observing	  the	  behavior	  that	  led	  to	  the	  reward.	  Recognizing	  that	  reward	  signals	  consist	  of	  different	  components	  was	  an	  important	  first	  step	  in	  understanding	  the	  complex	  effects	  of	  reward.	  Additionally,	  it	  reveals	  that	  the	  study	  of	  reward	  brings	  together	  three	  major	  fields	  of	  contemporary	  psychology:	  affective,	  motivational,	  and	  cognitive.	  	  
We	  will	  argue	  that	  to	  understand	  the	  effects	  of	  reward	  on	  cognitive	  control,	  a	  similar	  distinction	  should	  be	  made.	  We	  will	  dissociate	  explorative,	  exploitative	  and	  proactive	  control	  components.	  Once	  this	  distinction	  is	  made,	  a	  pattern	  starts	  to	  emerge	  and	  one	  can	  link	  each	  reward	  component	  to	  one	  specific	  cognitive	  control	  component.	  We	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  hedonic	  reward	  component	  activates	  explorative	  control	  processes,	  that	  the	  learning	  component	  promotes	  exploitative	  control	  processes,	  and	  the	  motivational	  component	  engages	  proactive	  control	  processes.	  Last,	  we	  will	  offer	  some	  preliminary	  guidelines	  on	  how	  these	  different	  components	  and	  their	  interactions	  can	  be	  disentangled	  and	  investigated.	  	   Parsing	  reward	  	  In	  general,	  psychologists	  seem	  to	  agree	  that	  reward	  is	  not	  a	  unitary	  concept	  but	  they	  seem	  to	  disagree	  on	  how	  to	  parse	  it.	  Here,	  we	  adhere	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  looking	  at	  reward	  in	  terms	  of	  three	  distinguishable	  psychological	  components:	  affective,	  motivational	  and	  learning	  (Berridge	  &	  Robinson,	  2003).	  	  The	  affective	  component	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  hedonic	  aspect	  of	  reward.	  Berridge	  and	  Robinson	  also	  call	  this	  component	  the	  ‘liking’	  component.	  	  It	  involves	  opioid	  neurotransmission	  onto	  GABAergic	  neurons	  in	  the	  nucleus	  accumbens	  and,	  contrary	  to	  traditional	  assumptions,	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  mediated	  by	  dopamine.	  	  Whereas	  microinjection	  of	  opioid	  agonists	  increased	  facial	  liking	  reactions	  to	  sweetness	  (Pecina	  &	  Berridge,	  2000)	  dopamine	  agonists	  do	  not	  change	  this	  (Wyvell	  &	  Berridge,	  2000).	  	  The	  affective	  value	  of	  reward	  signals	  is	  most	  likely	  triggered	  by	  signals	  that	  enhance	  the	  inherently	  positive	  feeling	  associated	  with	  reward.	  In	  human	  experimental	  studies,	  this	  is	  typically	  accomplished	  by	  presenting	  affective	  pictures,	  emoticons	  or	  smiling	  faces.	  Positive	  affect	  can	  be	  triggered	  by	  the	  delivery	  of	  reward,	  but	  also	  by	  the	  anticipation	  of	  reward.	  The	  motivational	  (wanting)	  component	  of	  reward	  is	  primarily	  activated	  when	  a	  cue	  informs	  participants	  that	  the	  following	  trial(s)	  can	  be	  rewarded	  when	  performed	  successfully.	  This	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  cue-­‐triggered	  wanting.	  	  Rewards	  that	  are	  liked	  are	  also	  wanted;	  both	  components	  are	  therefore	  often	  co-­‐activated.	  However,	  pharmacological	  manipulations	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  two	  components	  are	  dissociable.	  Manipulations	  of	  the	  dopamine	  network	  affect	  motivated	  behavior	  but	  not	  the	  liking	  
response	  (Berridge,	  2007).	  The	  motivational	  component	  includes	  an	  extensive	  network	  with	  the	  accumbens,	  amygdala,	  basal	  forebrain	  and	  cortex.	  This	  component	  is	  also	  involved	  in	  addictive	  behavior	  (e.g.,	  the	  incentive	  sensitization	  theory	  of	  addiction,	  Robinson	  &	  Berridge,	  2008).	  While	  it	  is	  fairly	  easy	  to	  assess	  the	  emotional	  state	  of	  participants	  in	  various	  conditions,	  measuring	  the	  motivational	  state	  is	  more	  difficult.	  Motivational	  effects	  are	  typically	  ‘recognized’	  by	  means	  of	  changes	  in	  behavior.	  For	  instance,	  when	  participants	  respond	  faster	  in	  a	  particular	  task,	  or	  when	  they	  make	  fewer	  errors,	  it	  is	  interpreted	  as	  a	  motivational	  effect.	  Some	  studies	  do	  not	  present	  actual	  cues,	  but	  deliver	  reward	  only	  to	  a	  particular	  subset	  of	  stimuli.	  In	  those	  studies,	  the	  stimuli	  themselves	  act	  as	  a	  reward	  cue.	  	  For	  instance,	  Krebs,	  Boehler,	  and	  Woldorff	  (2010)	  associated	  reward	  to	  two	  out	  of	  four	  colors	  in	  a	  Stroop	  task.	  Stimulus	  color	  thus	  acted	  as	  a	  reward	  cue	  motivating	  participants	  to	  enhance	  performance.	  In	  this	  volume,	  Krebs,	  Hopf	  and	  Boehler	  describe	  similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  cue-­‐based	  and	  stimulus-­‐based	  reward	  effects.	  Reward	  also	  has	  a	  learning	  component.	  	  This	  was	  initially	  captured	  by	  behaviorists,	  in	  interpreting	  reward	  as	  a	  positive	  reinforcer.	  A	  positive	  reinforcer	  is	  a	  stimulus	  that	  is	  presented	  after	  an	  action	  and	  has	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  action	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  re-­‐occur	  (aka	  Thorndike’s	  law	  of	  effect,	  Thorndike,	  1911).	  Today,	  this	  principle	  lives	  on	  in	  the	  research	  field	  of	  ‘reinforcement	  learning’	  which	  –	  inspired	  by	  these	  century-­‐old	  theories	  –	  is	  devoted	  to	  the	  development	  of	  computational	  models	  of	  machine	  learning	  and	  neuroscience.	  The	  central	  idea	  of	  reinforcement	  learning	  is	  that	  agents	  are	  learning	  how	  to	  behave	  so	  as	  to	  maximize	  reward.	  The	  maximization	  of	  reward	  is	  the	  only	  goal	  that	  is	  implemented.	  In	  contrast	  to	  other	  computational	  approaches,	  the	  agent	  is	  not	  instructed	  what	  will	  be	  rewarded,	  but	  must	  discover	  what	  actions	  are	  rewarded	  (learning	  from	  interaction).	  One	  of	  the	  most	  intriguing	  aspects	  of	  reinforcement	  learning	  is	  the	  balance	  between	  exploration	  and	  exploitation.	  In	  order	  to	  maximize	  reward,	  the	  agent	  must	  exploit	  actions	  that	  were	  rewarded	  in	  the	  past,	  but	  in	  order	  to	  find	  potentially	  higher	  rewards,	  the	  agent	  must	  also	  explore	  the	  environment	  (Sutton	  &	  Barto,	  1998).	  This	  balance,	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  stability	  versus	  flexibility,	  is	  also	  recognized	  as	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  cognitive	  control	  (Cohen,	  McClure,	  &	  Yu,	  2007).	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  reward	  signals	  will	  often	  activate	  all	  components	  but	  the	  relative	  weight	  of	  each	  component	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  nature	  and	  context	  of	  the	  reward	  
signal.	  Before	  we	  discuss	  the	  effects	  of	  reward	  on	  cognitive	  control,	  we	  will	  first	  briefly	  introduce	  various	  aspects	  of	  cognitive	  control.	  	   Parsing	  cognitive	  control	  	  Broadly	  defined,	  cognitive	  control	  is	  the	  psychological	  function	  that	  keeps	  track	  of	  changing	  task-­‐demands	  in	  order	  to	  adjust	  information	  processing	  accordingly.	  This	  function	  is	  studied	  in	  task-­‐switching,	  congruency	  tasks,	  decision	  making,	  stop-­‐signal	  paradigms	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Although	  cognitive	  control	  is	  often	  described	  as	  a	  unitary	  function,	  we	  believe	  that	  for	  understanding	  the	  effects	  of	  reward	  thereon,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  dissociate	  different	  forms	  of	  cognitive	  control.	  	  In	  order	  to	  keep	  information	  processing	  optimally	  adjusted	  to	  the	  environment,	  different	  types	  of	  control	  processes	  are	  required.	  Imagine	  writing	  a	  book	  chapter	  with	  a	  world	  championship	  soccer	  game	  playing	  in	  the	  background.	  When	  you	  hear	  the	  commentator	  raising	  his	  voice,	  it	  will	  be	  harder	  for	  you	  to	  focus	  on	  your	  writing.	  However,	  when	  you	  are	  highly	  motivated,	  you	  can	  increase	  selective	  attention	  and	  ignore	  the	  auditory	  irrelevant	  information.	  This	  adjustment	  of	  selective	  attention	  serves	  to	  increase	  stability	  and	  is	  often	  described	  as	  goal	  shielding.	  In	  reinforcement	  learning	  terms,	  we	  could	  say	  that	  this	  type	  of	  process	  serves	  exploitation	  of	  the	  environment.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  to	  deliberately	  keep	  the	  television	  on	  to	  simultaneously	  stay	  informed	  about	  exciting	  game	  situations.	  In	  this	  case,	  cognitive	  control	  processes	  are	  required	  to	  increase	  flexibility,	  or	  exploration.	  For	  this,	  we	  can	  rely	  on	  reactive	  control	  processes	  (e.g.,	  reactive	  upon	  the	  commentators	  raised	  voice,	  or	  the	  book	  chapter's	  content).	  However,	  cognitive	  control	  can	  also	  operate	  in	  a	  proactive	  way:	  by	  anticipating	  a	  difficult	  paragraph	  or	  a	  deciding	  penalty	  shootout,	  we	  can	  proactively	  change	  our	  attention	  accordingly.	  This	  distinction	  between	  reactive	  and	  proactive	  control	  is	  well	  captured	  by	  the	  dual-­‐mechanisms	  of	  control	  (DMC)	  framework	  of	  Braver	  (2012).	  	  
Exploitation	  is	  a	  term	  borrowed	  from	  reinforcement	  learning.	  It	  describes	  behavior	  where	  agents	  repeat	  actions	  that	  have	  been	  rewarded	  in	  the	  past.	  This	  behavior	  is	  served	  by	  a	  psychological	  function	  that	  goes	  by	  many	  different	  names;	  selective	  attention,	  interference	  suppression,	  goal	  shielding,	  and	  so	  on.	  Although	  each	  of	  these	  functions	  is	  studied	  in	  specific	  paradigms,	  they	  all	  investigate	  how	  participants	  keep	  their	  focus	  on	  task-­‐relevant	  information	  and	  increase	  stability.	  We	  consider	  conflict	  
adaptation	  as	  a	  prototypical	  example	  of	  this	  type	  of	  cognitive	  control	  behavior.	  Conflict	  adaptation	  is	  typically	  studied	  in	  congruency	  tasks	  like	  the	  Simon,	  the	  Stroop,	  and	  the	  Eriksen	  flanker	  task	  (Stroop,	  1935;	  Simon	  &	  Rudell,	  1967;	  Eriksen	  and	  Eriksen,	  1974).	  In	  the	  Stroop	  task	  for	  instance,	  participants	  have	  to	  name	  the	  ink	  colour	  of	  a	  word,	  ignoring	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  word.	  In	  this	  task,	  congruent	  stimuli	  (GREEN	  in	  green	  ink)	  are	  faster	  responded	  to	  than	  incongruent	  stimuli	  (RED	  in	  green	  ink).	  When	  the	  congruency	  effect	  is	  calculated	  separately	  for	  trials	  following	  congruent	  and	  incongruent	  trials,	  we	  observe	  a	  smaller	  congruency	  effect	  after	  incongruent	  trials	  than	  after	  congruent	  trials.	  This	  conflict	  adaptation	  pattern,	  also	  called	  the	  Gratton	  effect	  (after	  Gabrielle	  Gratton,	  who	  reported	  this	  effect	  for	  the	  first	  time),	  or	  the	  congruency	  sequence	  effect,	  presumably	  reflects	  increased	  task	  focus	  after	  encountering	  difficulties	  on	  an	  incongruent	  trial	  (Gratton,	  Coles	  &	  Donchin,	  1992).	  Verguts	  and	  Notebaert	  (2008;	  2009)	  provided	  a	  computational	  explanation	  for	  this	  behavioral	  pattern,	  which	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  the	  present	  work,	  because	  it	  relies	  on	  reinforcement	  learning	  principles.	  Without	  going	  into	  too	  much	  detail,	  the	  model	  uses	  the	  detection	  of	  conflict	  as	  a	  learning	  signal,	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  (active)	  task-­‐relevant	  associations,	  thereby	  exploiting	  the	  behavior	  that	  led	  to	  successful	  conflict	  resolution.	  Note	  that	  this	  model	  was	  developed	  to	  capture	  various	  cognitive	  control	  effects	  in	  terms	  of	  general	  reinforcement	  learning	  principles.	  	  
Exploration	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  is	  behavior	  intended	  to	  find	  new	  and	  potentially	  higher	  rewards.	  This	  requires	  keeping	  an	  eye	  open	  for	  opportunities,	  and	  hence,	  processing	  more	  (irrelevant)	  information.	  While	  cognitive	  stability	  or	  exploitation	  is	  often	  beneficial	  in	  the	  above-­‐described	  single	  conflict	  tasks,	  it	  can	  interfere	  with	  efficient	  task	  performance	  in	  other	  paradigms,	  such	  as	  task	  switching	  experiments	  (as	  demonstrated	  by	  Goschke,	  2000;	  Brown,	  Reynolds,	  &	  Braver,	  2007),	  where	  an	  exploratory	  mode	  can	  be	  more	  advantageous.	  In	  task	  switching	  studies,	  participants	  receive	  two	  different	  task	  goals.	  For	  instance,	  in	  a	  magnitude/parity	  task-­‐switching	  experiment	  participants	  have	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  magnitude	  of	  a	  number	  whenever	  it	  is	  presented	  in	  green	  (<	  5	  press	  left;	  >	  5	  press	  right),	  and	  a	  parity	  task	  when	  the	  number	  is	  colored	  in	  blue	  (odd	  press	  left;	  even	  press	  right).	  Explorative	  behavior	  will	  result	  in	  smaller	  task-­‐switch	  costs	  because	  participants	  keep	  a	  wide	  attentional	  focus,	  making	  them	  better	  prepared	  for	  task	  alternations.	  	  
Like	  exploitation	  and	  exploration,	  anticipation	  is	  another	  type	  of	  cognitive	  control	  behavior.	  The	  psychological	  function	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  proactive	  control,	  as	  opposed	  to	  reactive	  control	  processes.	  In	  the	  dual	  mechanisms	  of	  control	  model,	  reactive	  and	  proactive	  control	  modes	  are	  distinguished	  (Braver,	  2012).	  Whereas	  reactive	  control	  reacts	  to	  stimuli,	  proactive	  control	  anticipates	  the	  onset	  of	  stimuli.	  Proactive	  control	  is	  typically	  investigated	  in	  cueing	  paradigms,	  but	  expectations	  can	  also	  trigger	  anticipatory	  behavior	  (e.g.,	  Duthoo,	  Abrahamse,	  Braem,	  &	  Notebaert,	  2013;	  Duthoo,	  De	  Baene,	  Wühr,	  &	  Notebaert,	  2012).	  Anticipatory	  processes	  can	  induce	  exploitation	  and	  exploration.	  In	  a	  task	  switching	  study,	  for	  instance,	  a	  task	  cue	  indicating	  that	  the	  same	  task	  will	  be	  repeated	  will	  increase	  stability,	  while	  a	  task-­‐switch	  cue	  will	  trigger	  flexibility.	  We	  propose	  that	  cognitive	  control	  serves	  explorative,	  exploitative	  and	  proactive	  behavior.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  first	  time	  that	  the	  diversity	  of	  cognitive	  control	  was	  recognized.	  Baddeley	  and	  Hitch	  (1974)	  proposed	  that	  working	  memory	  includes	  three	  components.	  In	  addition	  to	  two	  slave	  components	  specialized	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  phonological	  information	  (phonological	  loop)	  and	  visuospatial	  information	  (visuospatial	  sketchpad),	  there	  is	  a	  central	  executive	  controlling	  cognitive	  processes.	  Inspired	  by	  this	  model,	  Miyake	  et	  al.	  (2000)	  distinguished	  mental	  set	  shifting,	  information	  updating,	  and	  monitoring	  and	  inhibition	  of	  prepotent	  responses	  as	  three	  separate	  functions.	  Notably,	  these	  models	  are	  inspired	  by	  a	  modular	  view	  of	  the	  brain,	  stressing	  the	  functional	  specialization	  of	  specific	  brain	  structures.	  	  We	  propose	  a	  distinction	  based	  on	  cognitive	  strategies,	  rather	  than	  specific	  control	  components	  or	  functions.	  Importantly,	  our	  approach	  is	  only	  meant	  to	  complement,	  rather	  than	  re-­‐evaluate	  the	  framework	  presented	  by	  Miyake.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  best	  to	  see	  the	  present	  categorization	  between	  different	  cognitive	  control	  strategies,	  as	  one	  that	  can	  subsume	  or	  differentially	  recruit	  some	  of	  the	  more	  specific	  functions	  proposed	  by	  Miyake	  and	  colleagues	  (2000).	  For	  example,	  exploitation	  can	  involve	  functions	  like	  inhibition	  and	  information	  updating,	  while	  exploration	  might	  involve	  functions	  like	  set	  shifting	  and	  information	  updating.	  Distinguishing	  between	  these	  two	  types	  of	  categorization	  is	  also	  elucidating	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  unity	  or	  diversity	  debate.	  While	  cognitive	  control	  clearly	  depends	  on	  a	  diversity	  of	  specific	  control	  functions,	  most	  strategies	  often	  require	  a	  combination	  of	  processes.	  	  
In	  the	  framework	  we	  present	  here,	  we	  dissociate	  three	  types	  of	  cognitive	  control	  processes,	  or	  three	  control	  components;	  exploitation,	  exploration	  and	  anticipation.	  Interestingly,	  in	  doing	  so,	  a	  natural	  match	  occurs	  with	  the	  above-­‐described	  components	  of	  reward.	  In	  the	  following	  section,	  we	  will	  describe	  how	  the	  motivational	  component	  of	  reward	  recruits	  anticipatory	  control	  processes,	  how	  the	  hedonic	  reward	  component	  promotes	  exploratory	  control	  processes,	  and	  how	  reward-­‐based	  learning	  relies	  on	  exploitative	  control	  processes	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  	   Parsing	  the	  effects	  of	  reward	  on	  cognitive	  control	  	  Several	  recent	  studies	  tried	  to	  investigate	  the	  influence	  of	  reward	  on	  cognitive	  control,	  but	  the	  results	  remain	  equivocal	  and	  call	  for	  a	  better	  conceptualization	  and	  dissociation	  of	  reward	  schedules	  (see	  also	  Chiew	  &	  Braver,	  2011;	  Dreisbach	  &	  Fischer,	  2012).	  Specifically,	  while	  some	  studies	  focused	  on	  block-­‐wise	  effects	  of	  reward	  schedules	  (e.g.,	  Locke	  &	  Braver,	  2008),	  others	  investigated	  the	  effects	  of	  random	  reward	  cues	  preceding	  the	  trial	  to	  indicate	  if	  a	  trial	  can	  be	  rewarding	  or	  not	  (e.g.,	  Padmala	  &	  Pessoa,	  2011).	  Alternatively,	  other	  studies	  have	  looked	  at	  the	  influence	  of	  item-­‐specific	  reward	  on	  conflict	  processing	  (e.g.,	  Krebs,	  Boehler,	  &	  Woldorff,	  2010),	  while	  yet	  another	  group	  of	  studies	  used	  designs	  where	  reward	  signals	  were	  not	  cued,	  but	  only	  followed	  performance,	  either	  performance-­‐contingent	  (e.g.,	  Stürmer	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  or	  not	  (e.g.,	  van	  Steenbergen	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  These	  precise	  reinforcement	  schedules	  aside,	  different	  types	  of	  reward	  signals	  have	  been	  used	  as	  well.	  While	  some	  used	  monetary	  gains	  denoted	  by	  (relatively)	  abstract	  symbols	  (e.g.,	  Braem	  et	  al.,	  2012,	  2014;	  Krebs,	  Boehler,	  &	  Woldorff,	  2010;	  Hickey	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Padmala	  &	  Pessoa,	  2011;	  Stürmer,	  Nigbur,	  Schacht,	  &	  Sommer,	  2011),	  others	  used	  inherently	  affective	  smileys	  or	  affective	  pictures	  (Braem	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  van	  Steenbergen	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  2012).	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  former	  promoted	  motivational	  or	  learning	  components	  of	  reward,	  while	  the	  latter	  predominantly	  activated	  the	  hedonic	  aspect	  of	  reward.	  Lastly,	  these	  studies	  also	  differ	  in	  the	  behavioral	  measure	  of	  interest.	  While	  some	  mainly	  focus	  on	  exploitative	  behavior	  (e.g.,	  van	  Steenbergen	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  others	  targeted	  explorative	  behavior	  (e.g.,	  Kleinsorge	  &	  Rinkenauer,	  2012),	  and	  yet	  others	  focused	  on	  proactive	  anticipatory	  behavior	  (e.g.,	  Chiew	  &	  Braver,	  2013).	  	  
Although	  there	  are	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  small	  differences	  between	  all	  these	  experiments,	  we	  believe	  a	  broad	  distinction	  can	  be	  made	  by	  using	  the	  framework	  introduced	  earlier.	  Therefore,	  in	  what	  follows,	  we	  will	  try	  to	  illustrate	  how	  these	  experimental	  designs	  have	  variously	  targeted	  one	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  three	  reward	  components,	  by	  highlighting	  their	  differences	  in	  reward	  schedules,	  reward	  types,	  and	  cognitive	  paradigms.	  We	  will	  first	  discuss	  each	  of	  these	  three	  reward	  components	  in	  turn,	  along	  with	  their	  associated	  cognitive	  control	  behavior	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  	  	  In	  the	  subsequent	  section	  we	  will	  outline	  some	  first	  guidelines	  on	  how	  to	  dissociate	  between	  them.	  	  
	  Figure	  1.	  A	  schematic	  overview	  of	  the	  different	  reward	  components	  as	  identified	  by	  Berridge	  and	  Robinson	  (2003)	  with	  their	  associated	  cognitive	  control	  behavior.	  	  	  The	  hedonic	  effect	  of	  reward	  on	  cognitive	  control:	  exploration	  	  
The	  hedonic	  aspect	  of	  reward	  signals	  is	  so	  strong	  that	  reward	  is	  often	  used	  as	  a	  manipulation	  for	  mood	  induction.	  The	  effects	  of	  positive	  affect	  have	  been	  studied	  and	  well	  documented	  in	  scores	  of	  studies.	  In	  a	  review	  paper,	  Ashby,	  Alice	  and	  Turken	  (1999)	  already	  concluded	  that	  positive	  mood	  increases	  flexibility	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  more	  than	  25	  studies	  demonstrating	  improved	  performance	  in	  creative	  problem	  solving,	  decision	  making	  and	  fluency	  tasks.	  In	  line	  with	  this	  idea,	  Dreisbach	  and	  Goschke	  (2004)	  demonstrated	  that	  positive	  affect,	  induced	  by	  positive	  pictures,	  increased	  flexibility	  and	  decreased	  stability.	  Similarly,	  van	  Steenbergen,	  Band	  and	  Hommel	  (2009)	  presented	  smileys	  as	  reward	  signals	  that	  were	  delivered	  in	  a	  response	  non-­‐contingent	  manner.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  neutral	  trials,	  trials	  that	  followed	  (random)	  smileys	  did	  not	  show	  conflict	  adaptation	  –	  remember	  that	  conflict	  adaptation	  is	  aimed	  at	  increasing	  stability	  (decreasing	  distractor	  interference).	  The	  same	  authors	  demonstrated	  how	  positive	  mood	  induction	  reduced	  conflict	  adaptation	  (van	  Steenbergen,	  Band,	  &	  Hommel,	  2010;	  van	  Steenbergen,	  Band,	  Hommel,	  Rombouts,	  &	  Nieuwenhuis,	  2014;	  see	  also	  Kuhbandner	  &	  Zehetleitner,	  2011).	  Similarly,	  when	  reward	  was	  delivered	  in	  a	  non-­‐contingent	  manner,	  performance	  in	  the	  AX-­‐CPT	  dropped	  (Dreisbach,	  2006;	  but	  see	  Chiew	  &	  Braver,	  2014,	  who	  did	  not	  replicate	  this	  finding).	  These	  studies	  suggest	  that	  positive	  mood	  indeed	  increases	  flexibility	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  cognitive	  stability.	  	  The	  hedonic	  aspect	  of	  reward	  signals	  seems	  to	  have	  a	  counterproductive	  side	  effect	  as	  it	  decreases	  task	  focus.	  Ironically,	  whereas	  reward	  is	  typically	  administered	  as	  a	  reinforcer,	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  rewarded	  behavior	  will	  be	  repeated,	  the	  hedonic	  aspect	  of	  reward	  instead	  turns	  people	  away	  from	  the	  task.	  Therefore,	  an	  important	  question	  is	  how	  and	  why	  this	  hedonic	  component,	  and	  positive	  mood	  more	  generally,	  triggers	  explorative	  behavior.	  The	  conventional	  explanation	  is	  that	  both	  exploration	  and	  positive	  affect	  rely	  on	  similar	  dopaminergic	  networks	  (Ashby	  et	  al.,	  1999;	  although	  other	  accounts	  have	  stressed	  the	  role	  of	  norepinephrine	  in	  exploration	  as	  well;	  Aston-­‐Jones	  &	  Cohen,	  2005;	  Gilzenrat,	  Nieuwenhuis,	  Jepma,	  &	  Cohen,	  2010;	  Jepma	  &	  Nieuwenhuis,	  2011).	  Although	  this	  analogy	  is	  certainly	  interesting	  from	  a	  neuroscientific	  perspective,	  the	  answer	  as	  to	  why	  positive	  affect	  increases	  flexibility	  remains	  unanswered.	  For	  one,	  it	  has	  been	  postulated	  that	  positive	  mood	  activates	  more	  mood-­‐related	  thoughts	  and	  therefore	  results	  in	  a	  wider	  mindset	  (Seibert	  &	  Ellis,	  1991).	  However,	  one	  can	  also	  consider	  increased	  flexibility	  as	  a	  cognitive	  strategy,	  in	  search	  of	  new	  opportunities	  for	  reward.	  Perhaps	  positive	  mood	  acts	  as	  a	  trigger	  that	  new	  
rewards	  are	  available	  in	  the	  environment.	  	  For	  example,	  Carver	  (2003)	  suggested	  that	  positive	  feelings	  act	  as	  learning	  signals	  that	  inform	  us	  that	  things	  are	  going	  better	  than	  necessary.	  Next,	  this	  positive	  affect	  causes	  the	  agent	  to	  coast,	  drift	  off,	  and	  shift	  attention	  or	  effort	  to	  other	  domains,	  which	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  for	  detecting	  new	  opportunities	  or	  satisfying	  other	  goals.	  A	  similar	  ‘reversed’	  explanation	  has	  been	  put	  forward	  for	  the	  association	  between	  overall	  happiness	  and	  success	  (in	  marriage,	  job,	  sports,…).	  While	  success	  obviously	  makes	  people	  happy,	  happiness	  engenders	  success	  because	  positive	  mood	  makes	  people	  also	  approach	  goals	  (Lyubomirsky,	  King	  &	  Diener,	  2005).	  	  The	  authors	  state	  that	  “people	  experiencing	  positive	  emotions	  take	  advantage	  of	  their	  time	  in	  this	  state	  –free	  from	  immediate	  danger	  and	  unmarked	  by	  recent	  loss-­‐	  to	  seek	  new	  goals	  that	  they	  have	  not	  yet	  attained”	  (p	  804,	  Lyubomirsky	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  Therefore,	  when	  salient	  enough,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  hedonic	  aspect	  of	  reward	  might	  override	  the	  motivational	  and	  learning	  components	  of	  reward,	  thereby	  signaling	  a	  comfortable	  environment	  after	  successful	  performance	  (Carver,	  2003;	  Gable	  &	  Harmon-­‐Jones,	  2011),	  allowing	  for	  a	  more	  exploratory	  mode.	  	  	  	  The	  learning	  effect	  of	  reward	  on	  cognitive	  control:	  exploitation	  	  When	  reward	  is	  delivered	  contingent	  upon	  participants’	  performance	  by	  means	  of	  simple	  reward	  signals	  (e.g.,	  abstract	  cues),	  the	  hedonic	  effect	  of	  reward	  is	  minimized	  and	  the	  learning	  effect	  maximized.	  As	  both	  components	  have	  opposing	  effects	  on	  cognitive	  control	  in	  our	  conceptual	  model,	  small	  experimental	  variations	  can	  lead	  to	  large	  empirical	  changes.	  For	  example,	  whereas	  van	  Steenbergen	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  observed	  reduced	  conflict	  adaptation	  following	  random	  reward	  in	  the	  form	  of	  smiley	  faces,	  we	  observed	  increased	  conflict	  adaptation	  when	  delivering	  neutral	  reward	  signals	  (+1)	  on	  25%	  of	  the	  trials	  (Braem	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  In	  our	  study,	  reward	  was	  not	  cued,	  but	  presented	  contingent	  upon	  participants’	  performance	  as	  it	  was	  never	  presented	  following	  slow	  or	  incorrect	  trials.	  Both	  aspects	  (performance	  contingency	  and	  emotionally	  neutral	  signal)	  were	  deliberately	  chosen	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  affective	  (performance	  contingent	  neutral	  signal)	  and	  motivational	  (uncued	  feedback)	  component,	  therefore	  singling	  out	  the	  learning	  component	  (see	  also,	  Braem	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Hickey	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Stürmer	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  
How	  does	  reward	  increase	  stability?	  We	  believe	  the	  learning	  effect	  of	  reward	  is	  implemented	  by	  means	  of	  increasing	  goal-­‐relevant	  associations	  as	  described	  in	  the	  adaptation	  by	  binding	  model	  of	  Verguts	  and	  Notebaert	  (2008;	  2009).	  In	  this	  reinforcement	  learning	  model,	  a	  Hebbian	  learning	  signal	  is	  sent	  throughout	  the	  brain	  ensuring	  that	  goal-­‐relevant	  (active)	  representations	  and	  connections	  are	  being	  strengthened	  upon	  detection	  of	  cognitive	  conflict.	  This	  general	  idea	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  century-­‐old	  law	  of	  effect	  by	  Edward	  Thorndike	  (Thorndike,	  1911)	  stating	  that	  responses	  to	  a	  situation	  that	  are	  closely	  followed	  by	  rewarding	  stimuli	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  reoccur	  when	  this	  situation	  presents	  itself	  again.	  The	  main	  difference	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  increased	  binding	  of	  associations	  follows	  reward	  according	  to	  Thorndike	  (1911),	  and	  cognitive	  conflict	  according	  to	  Verguts	  and	  Notebaert	  (2008;	  2009).	  However,	  here,	  in	  line	  with	  recent	  developments	  in	  computational	  models	  of	  performance	  monitoring	  (Silvetti,	  Alexander,	  Verguts,	  &	  Brown,	  2013),	  we	  tentatively	  propose	  that	  the	  learning	  signal	  put	  forward	  in	  the	  model	  of	  Verguts	  and	  Notebaert	  (2009)	  could	  equally	  likely	  be	  a	  reward	  or	  performance	  prediction	  error	  which	  are	  both	  believed	  to	  be	  monitored	  by	  one	  and	  the	  same	  cortical	  structure:	  the	  anterior	  cingulate	  cortex	  (Alexander	  &	  Brown,	  2011;	  Silvetti	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Silvetti,	  Seurinck,	  &	  Verguts,	  2013).	  Specifically,	  we	  suggest	  that	  instead	  of	  conflict	  detection,	  conflict	  resolution	  might	  be	  what	  signals	  exploitation.	  The	  idea	  that	  successfully	  responding	  to	  difficult	  task	  conditions	  (conflict	  resolution)	  can	  trigger	  an	  intrinsic	  reward	  on	  its	  own	  is	  not	  new	  (e.g.,	  Alessandri,	  Darcheville,	  Delevoye-­‐Turrell,	  &	  Zentall,	  2008;	  Satterthwaite	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  In	  fact,	  a	  recent	  observation	  from	  our	  lab	  tested	  this	  for	  conflict	  processing	  specifically	  (Schouppe	  et	  al.,	  in	  press):	  participants	  had	  to	  perform	  a	  conflict	  task	  (Experiment	  2)	  followed	  by	  an	  affective	  judgment	  task	  with	  positive	  and	  negative	  words.	  Interestingly,	  correct	  performance	  on	  incongruent,	  relative	  to	  congruent,	  trials	  led	  to	  a	  significant	  benefit	  in	  reaction	  times	  on	  the	  evaluation	  of	  positive,	  relative	  to	  negative,	  words.	  This	  finding	  was	  interpreted	  as	  reflecting	  an	  intrinsic	  reward	  signal	  following	  the	  resolution	  of	  a	  difficult	  task.	  Now,	  we	  suggest	  that	  this	  intrinsic	  reward	  signal	  triggered	  by	  resolving	  cognitive	  conflict	  can	  also	  be	  what	  motivates	  us	  in	  exploiting	  the	  associations	  that	  led	  to	  this	  successful	  response	  (for	  similar	  suggestions,	  see	  Braem	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Schouppe	  et	  al.,	  in	  press).	  	  This	  idea	  is	  consistent	  with	  findings	  that:	  a)	  cognitive	  conflict	  and	  errors	  evoke	  different	  cognitive	  strategies	  (Notebaert	  &	  Verguts,	  2011;	  Stürmer	  et	  al.,	  2011);	  and	  b)	  
conflict	  adaptation	  is	  conditional	  on	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  previous	  response	  (Van	  der	  Borght,	  Braem,	  &	  Notebaert,	  2014).	  Moreover,	  in	  demonstrating	  that	  reward	  enhances	  conflict	  adaptation,	  we	  also	  showed	  an	  absence	  of	  conflict	  adaptation	  following	  no-­‐reward	  (Braem	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Consistently,	  several	  reward	  studies	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  cognitive	  control	  effect	  of	  interest	  often	  disappears	  following	  low	  or	  no	  reward	  signals	  (Braem	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Hickey	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Jiang	  &	  Xu,	  2014;	  Muhle-­‐Karbe	  &	  Krebs,	  2012).	  These	  findings	  further	  hint	  at	  the	  idea	  that	  intrinsic	  motivation	  might	  play	  an	  underestimated	  role	  in	  cognitive	  tasks	  without	  reward	  (Satterthwaite	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Schouppe	  et	  al.,	  in	  press;	  Silvetti,	  Alexander,	  Verguts,	  &	  Brown,	  in	  press),	  and	  as	  we	  have	  argued,	  might	  even	  drive	  some	  of	  these	  typical	  indices	  of	  cognitive	  control.	  Thus,	  assuming	  that	  being	  correct	  is	  its	  own	  reward	  (Satterthwaite	  et	  al.,	  2012)	  and	  therefore	  promotes	  exploitative	  cognitive	  strategies,	  we	  argue	  that	  the	  learning	  component	  of	  reward	  and	  cognitive	  exploitation	  are	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin.	  In	  general,	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  our	  framework	  is	  that	  exploration	  and	  exploitation	  are	  not	  competitive	  modes,	  but	  rather	  two	  different	  cognitive	  control	  components.	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  earlier	  models	  (Brown,	  Reynolds	  and	  Braver,	  2007).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  specific	  task	  setting	  will	  most	  likely	  determine	  whether	  both	  strategies	  are	  independent	  or	  competitive.	  In	  gambling	  tasks	  for	  instance,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  exploration	  (switching	  to	  an	  alternative)	  is	  in	  competition	  with	  exploitation	  (staying	  with	  one	  choice).	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  the	  hedonic	  effect	  of	  reward	  (increased	  exploration)	  is	  always	  decreasing	  task	  focus	  (exploitation).	  The	  interplay	  between	  exploration	  and	  exploitation	  should	  therefore	  be	  further	  investigated	  using	  new	  paradigms	  (see	  guidelines	  for	  future	  research).	  	  	  The	  motivational	  effect	  of	  reward	  on	  cognitive	  control:	  anticipation	  	  The	  motivational	  effect	  of	  reward	  can	  be	  studied	  by	  cueing	  participants	  that	  reward	  is	  at	  stake	  on	  the	  following	  trial.	  These	  cues	  trigger	  anticipatory	  behavior	  by	  means	  of	  proactive	  control	  processes.	  Depending	  on	  what	  the	  participants	  are	  anticipating	  proactive	  control	  process	  either	  increase	  stability	  or	  increase	  flexibility	  by	  means	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  described	  above.	  Padmala	  and	  Pessoa	  (2011),	  for	  instance,	  presented	  pictures	  of	  houses	  and	  buildings	  with	  the	  words	  HOUSE,	  BLDNG	  or	  XXXXX	  printed	  over	  the	  pictures,	  creating	  congruent,	  incongruent	  and	  neutral	  Stroop-­‐like	  trials.	  Trials	  
started	  with	  the	  presentation	  of	  a	  cue	  $00	  or	  $20.	  The	  high	  reward	  cues	  decreased	  both	  interference	  (incongruent	  vs	  neutral)	  and	  facilitation	  (congruent	  vs	  neutral).	  	  Krebs	  and	  colleagues	  (2010)	  used	  a	  slightly	  different	  approach	  and	  rewarded	  only	  a	  subset	  of	  colors	  in	  a	  color	  Stroop	  task	  and	  observed	  reduced	  Stroop	  interference	  for	  rewarded	  colors.	  Using	  this	  approach,	  reward	  information	  and	  task	  information	  are	  being	  presented	  simultaneously	  and	  it	  is	  still	  discussed	  whether	  this	  also	  reflects	  (fast)	  anticipatory	  control.	  However,	  the	  contingency	  between	  a	  specific	  task-­‐relevant	  stimulus	  feature	  (color)	  and	  reward	  might	  have	  triggered	  the	  learning	  component	  as	  well.	  Indeed,	  Krebs	  and	  colleagues	  also	  observed	  that	  irrelevant	  words	  related	  to	  the	  rewarded	  colors	  resulted	  in	  greater	  interference,	  suggesting	  increased	  activation	  for	  the	  rewarded	  semantic	  category.	  	  In	  this	  volume,	  Krebs,	  Hopf,	  and	  Böhler	  argue	  in	  favor	  of	  distinguishing	  cue-­‐based	  and	  feature-­‐	  based	  anticipatory	  behavior.	  Although	  they	  recognize	  that	  more	  research	  is	  required,	  they	  tentatively	  suggest	  that	  cue-­‐based	  processes	  are	  more	  proactive	  in	  nature,	  while	  feature-­‐based	  processes	  are	  more	  reactive	  in	  nature.	  	  The	  above-­‐mentioned	  results	  suggest	  that	  reward	  prospect	  strengthened	  goal	  relevant	  processes.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  (and	  other	  studies	  demonstrating	  similar	  effects),	  we	  would	  conclude	  that	  the	  motivational	  effect	  of	  reward	  increases	  stability.	  However,	  there	  is	  also	  support	  for	  the	  idea	  that	  reward	  prospect	  increases	  flexibility	  (decreased	  task-­‐switch	  cost;	  Kleinsorge	  &	  Rinkenauer,	  2012).	  Moreover,	  in	  a	  recent	  study	  Aarts	  and	  colleagues	  (2014)	  demonstrated	  that	  individual	  differences	  in	  levels	  of	  dopamine	  modulated	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  promised	  reward.	  To	  this	  end,	  a	  spatial	  Stroop	  task	  was	  administered	  where	  each	  trial	  was	  preceded	  by	  a	  first	  cue	  that	  indicated	  whether	  high	  (15	  dollar	  cents)	  or	  low	  reward	  (1	  dollar	  cent)	  could	  be	  obtained,	  and	  a	  second	  cue	  that	  either	  indicated	  congruency	  identity	  (informative)	  or	  not	  (uninformative).	  Reward	  was	  delivered	  in	  a	  response-­‐contingent	  manner,	  that	  is,	  only	  for	  fast	  and	  correct	  answers.	  There	  was	  no	  overall	  effect	  of	  reward	  in	  this	  task,	  but	  the	  effect	  of	  promised	  reward	  depended	  on	  individual	  dopamine-­‐synthesis	  capacity.	  For	  participants	  with	  higher	  dopamine-­‐synthesis	  capacity,	  the	  Stroop	  effect	  following	  uninformative	  cues,	  but	  not	  following	  informative	  cues,	  was	  increased	  in	  high	  reward	  trials.	  The	  authors	  propose	  that	  for	  participants	  with	  high	  dopamine-­‐synthesis	  capacity,	  the	  prospect	  of	  high	  reward	  might	  ‘overdose’	  the	  dopaminergic	  system	  leading	  to	  poorer	  rather	  than	  better	  performance.	  This	  dopamine	  overdose	  explanation	  has	  also	  been	  used	  to	  explain	  some	  
of	  the	  unexpected	  findings	  of	  dopamine	  medication	  in	  patients	  with	  Parkinson’s	  disease	  (e.g.,	  Cools	  &	  D'Esposito,	  2011;	  Duthoo	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  	  	   Determining	  factors	  	  We	  are	  aware	  that	  our	  conceptual	  framework	  is	  difficult	  to	  falsify.	  One	  of	  the	  challenges	  is	  to	  predict	  which	  component(s)	  will	  be	  activated	  by	  the	  reward	  signal	  and	  hence	  to	  predict	  the	  specific	  effect	  of	  reward	  on	  cognitive	  control	  accordingly.	  As	  systematic	  comparisons	  disentangling	  different	  factors	  of	  reward	  (Braem	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Chiew	  and	  Braver,	  2014;	  Fröber	  and	  Dreisbach,	  2014)	  are	  still	  relatively	  scarce,	  there	  is	  room	  and	  need	  for	  dedicated	  work	  disentangling	  these	  different	  components	  of	  reward	  (for	  similar	  conclusions,	  see	  Braver	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Chiew	  &	  Braver,	  2011;	  Dreisbach	  &	  Fischer,	  2012).	  We	  identified	  two	  important	  factors	  that	  determine	  the	  effect	  of	  reward	  on	  control:	  reward	  signal	  (reward	  saliency	  and	  stimulus	  duration)	  and	  reward	  schedule	  (cue	  presence	  and	  performance	  contingency),	  which	  we	  will	  elaborate	  on	  below.	  	  	  Reward	  signal:	  reward	  saliency	  and	  stimulus	  duration	  	  Consider	  the	  following	  analogy:	  Imagine	  you	  are	  playing	  pinball	  at	  the	  arcade.	  The	  main	  goal	  is	  to	  keep	  the	  steel	  ball	  away	  from	  the	  drain	  by	  using	  two	  hand-­‐controlled	  "flippers"	  to	  gather	  as	  many	  points	  as	  possible.	  You	  can	  experience	  your	  gained	  points	  as	  reward	  signals	  narrowing	  your	  focus	  and	  helping	  you	  to	  concentrate	  on	  the	  game.	  However,	  secondary	  objectives	  and	  bonus	  missions	  can	  maximize	  your	  score	  even	  faster.	  Achieving	  those	  bonus	  missions	  or	  breaking	  a	  record,	  often	  indicated	  by	  a	  victory	  song	  or	  flickering	  lights,	  will	  get	  you	  even	  more	  excited,	  up	  to	  the	  point	  that	  this	  might	  bring	  you	  in	  a	  positive	  mood	  which	  will	  broaden	  your	  focus,	  and	  increase	  distractibility.	  Similarly,	  abstract	  reward	  signals	  indicating	  small	  monetary	  gains	  often	  help	  us	  focusing	  on	  the	  task	  at	  hand	  (Braem	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Jiang	  &	  Xu,	  2014;	  Stürmer	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  while	  more	  salient	  reward	  signals	  such	  as	  positive	  pictures	  or	  smiley	  faces	  can	  induce	  a	  positive	  mood	  and	  exploratory	  focus,	  counteracting	  task	  focus	  (e.g.,	  Braem	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  van	  Steenbergen	  et	  al.,	  2009,	  2012),	  but	  facilitating	  task	  switching	  (Dreisbach	  &	  Goschke,	  2004).	  
This	  dissociation	  does	  not	  necessarily	  constitute	  a	  dichotomy	  in	  reward	  signal	  type.	  Instead,	  it	  could	  also	  represent	  both	  ends	  of	  a	  continuum,	  where	  the	  more	  salient	  or	  affective	  a	  reward	  signal	  becomes,	  the	  more	  the	  hedonic	  component	  will	  be	  activated,	  and	  the	  more	  it	  will	  bring	  the	  subject	  into	  a	  positive	  mood,	  setting	  the	  stage	  for	  an	  exploratory	  mode	  of	  cognitive	  control.	  When,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  the	  reinforcement	  signals	  are	  more	  basic,	  merely	  providing	  somebody	  with	  performance	  feedback,	  these	  signals	  will	  only	  be	  used	  to	  strengthen	  information	  processing	  associations.	  	  Interestingly,	  in	  a	  recent	  review,	  Bijleveld,	  Custers	  and	  Aarts	  (2012)	  suggested	  that	  rewards	  can	  be	  processed	  on	  different	  levels.	  When	  rewards	  are	  presented	  only	  briefly,	  or	  time	  does	  not	  permit	  a	  full	  processing	  of	  the	  reward	  signal,	  rewards	  are	  only	  processed	  in	  a	  rudimentary	  form,	  quickly	  updating	  task	  associations	  and	  facilitating	  task	  performance.	  However,	  when	  rewards	  can	  be	  processed	  more	  fully,	  more	  strategic	  decisions	  can	  be	  made	  and	  the	  effect	  on	  performance	  can	  then	  diverge	  from	  those	  of	  initial	  reward	  processing.	  We	  believe	  this	  framework	  can	  also	  apply	  to	  the	  above-­‐described	  dissociation.	  When	  time	  is	  short	  and	  reward	  signals	  are	  basic	  (Braem	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Stürmer	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  rewards	  mainly	  activate	  the	  learning	  component	  and	  result	  in	  a	  quick	  reinforcement	  of	  the	  ongoing	  learning	  processes.	  However,	  when	  the	  inter-­‐trial	  interval	  is	  prolonged	  (e.g.,	  Braem	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  and	  rewards	  are	  more	  salient	  (e.g.,	  Braem	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  van	  Steenbergen	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  2012),	  reward	  activates	  the	  hedonic	  component	  and	  promotes	  an	  exploratory	  mode,	  helping	  at	  counteracting	  the	  conflict-­‐induced	  strengthening	  of	  associations	  that	  are	  disadvantageous	  for	  task-­‐switching.	  However,	  systematic	  comparisons	  are	  necessary	  to	  test	  these	  differences	  in	  reward	  signal	  type.	  Fröber	  and	  Dreisbach	  (2014)	  and	  Chiew	  and	  Braver	  (2014)	  recently	  set	  up	  such	  studies	  where	  they	  aimed	  at	  disentangling	  the	  motivational	  from	  the	  hedonic	  component	  of	  reward	  in	  the	  AX-­‐CPT	  task.	  The	  AX-­‐CPT	  task	  lends	  itself	  well	  to	  the	  testing	  of	  proactive	  control	  (relative	  to	  reactive	  control).	  Both	  studies	  demonstrated	  that	  performance-­‐contingent	  reward	  cues	  led	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  proactive	  control.	  A	  condition	  with	  tightly	  matched	  hedonic	  stimuli	  (non-­‐contingent	  positive	  pictures)	  either	  led	  to	  a	  smaller	  increase	  in	  proactive	  control	  (Chiew	  &	  Braver,	  2014)	  or	  a	  reduction	  in	  proactive	  control	  (Fröber	  &	  Dreisbach,	  2014).	  	  Reward	  schedule:	  cue	  presence	  and	  performance	  contingency	  	  
A	  first	  important	  factor	  in	  setting	  up	  your	  reinforcement	  schedule	  and	  testing	  the	  impact	  of	  reward	  on	  cognitive	  control	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  potential	  reward	  conditions	  will	  be	  cued	  or	  not.	  It	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  motivational	  component	  of	  reward	  or	  proactive	  control	  will	  be	  activated	  when	  reward	  is	  only	  delivered	  post-­‐performance.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  studies	  like	  the	  ones	  of	  Padmala	  and	  Pessoa	  (2011),	  Chiew	  and	  Braver	  (2013;	  2014),	  Fröber	  and	  Dreisbach	  (2014),	  Kleinsorge	  and	  Rinkenauer	  (2012),	  and	  so	  on,	  mainly	  target	  the	  motivational	  component	  of	  reward	  and	  proactive	  control,	  whereas	  studies	  like	  the	  ones	  of	  Braem	  and	  colleagues	  (2012;	  2013;	  in	  press),	  Stürmer	  and	  colleagues	  (2011)	  and	  van	  Steenbergen	  and	  colleagues	  (2009;	  2012)	  focus	  on	  the	  learning	  and/or	  hedonic	  aspect	  of	  reward,	  and	  exploitative	  and/or	  explorative	  behavior,	  but	  most	  likely	  not	  the	  motivational	  component.	  This	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind,	  as	  these	  studies	  potentially	  tap	  into	  different	  mechanisms.	  As	  a	  second	  factor,	  we	  identify	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  factor	  performance-­‐contingency	  in	  predicting	  which	  component	  of	  reward	  will	  be	  affected.	  In	  a	  first	  study,	  we	  aimed	  at	  testing	  the	  importance	  of	  performance	  contingency	  in	  driving	  hedonic	  modulations	  of	  cognitive	  control,	  we	  used	  affective	  pictures	  as	  feedback	  signals	  in	  a	  performance	  contingent	  or	  non-­‐contingent	  manner	  and	  showed	  a	  clear	  effect	  of	  this	  factor	  both	  on	  brain	  and	  behavior	  (Braem	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  Although,	  this	  modulation	  generally	  speaks	  in	  favor	  of	  our	  proposition,	  the	  specific	  directions	  of	  the	  effects	  were	  somewhat	  unpredicted.	  In	  the	  contingent	  condition,	  flexibility	  was	  promoted	  by	  positive	  feedback,	  while	  in	  the	  non-­‐contingent	  condition,	  positive	  stimuli	  promoted	  stability	  (each	  time	  relative	  to	  negative	  stimuli).	  According	  to	  our	  proposal,	  especially	  the	  non-­‐contingent	  condition	  should	  have	  loaded	  the	  hedonic	  component	  and	  hence	  increase	  flexibility,	  while	  the	  contingent	  condition	  was	  expected	  to	  load	  the	  cognitive	  component	  and	  increase	  stability.	  It	  is,	  however,	  important	  to	  note	  that	  in	  this	  study	  we	  presented	  inherently	  affective	  pictures	  (promoting	  positive	  affect	  and,	  hence,	  exploration)	  as	  reward	  signals,	  as	  well	  as	  more	  arousing	  negative	  pictures	  (which	  might	  have	  driven	  our	  modulation	  as	  well).	  Whereas	  our	  study	  focused	  on	  reactive	  control	  (exploitation	  more	  specifically),	  another	  study	  by	  Fröber	  and	  Dreisbach	  (2014)	  systematically	  compared	  the	  role	  of	  performance	  contingency	  in	  proactive	  control.	  There,	  the	  authors	  demonstrated	  how	  proactive	  control	  is	  promoted	  following	  cues	  signaling	  the	  possibility	  of	  receiving	  a	  performance-­‐contingent	  reward,	  but	  reduced	  following	  cues	  indicating	  non-­‐contingent	  rewards.	  
	  Guidelines	  for	  future	  research	  	  We	  alluded	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  saliency	  of	  the	  reward	  signal	  might	  determine	  to	  which	  extent	  it	  will	  induce	  the	  hedonic	  component	  of	  reward,	  assuming	  that	  more	  salient	  rewards	  will	  induce	  more	  positive	  feelings.	  This	  would	  induce	  an	  explorative	  mode	  of	  cognitive	  control	  (or	  coasting,	  see	  Carver,	  2003).	  Optimally,	  this	  hypothesis	  could	  be	  tested	  in	  a	  paradigm	  where	  the	  saliency	  or	  magnitude	  of	  affective	  stimuli	  is	  parametrically	  manipulated,	  best	  taking	  into	  account	  individual	  differences	  in	  responsiveness	  to	  these	  stimuli.	  Such	  a	  design	  could	  potentially	  demonstrate	  how	  reward	  signals	  are	  most	  efficient	  in	  promoting	  exploitation	  of	  the	  task	  set,	  when	  not	  too	  salient	  (for	  a	  similar	  reasoning	  on	  punishment	  signals,	  see	  Braem	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  Moreover,	  we	  hinted	  at	  the	  idea	  that	  longer	  reward	  presentations	  might	  induce	  more	  cognitive	  appraisal	  processes,	  resulting	  in	  more	  positive	  evaluations	  of	  the	  reward	  signal.	  Short	  presentations,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  only	  allow	  for	  a	  rudimentary	  impact	  on	  performance,	  quickly	  reinforcing	  whatever	  led	  to	  it.	  Again,	  this	  could	  be	  tested	  by	  parametrically	  manipulating	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  reward	  signal	  presentation	  and/or	  the	  reward-­‐stimulus	  interval.	  Besides	  varying	  the	  reward	  signal	  itself,	  researchers	  should	  also	  engage	  in	  comparing	  
different	  reinforcement	  schedules	  and	  performance	  contingencies.	  For	  example,	  keeping	  the	  reward	  signal	  type	  constant,	  one	  could	  contrast	  its	  use	  as	  a	  cue	  signal	  with	  that	  of	  a	  performance-­‐contingent	  feedback	  signal,	  promoting	  anticipatory	  and	  exploitative	  control,	  respectively.	  	  Finally,	  in	  testing	  the	  impact	  of	  reward	  on	  cognitive	  control,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  which	  cognitive	  paradigm	  is	  being	  used.	  For	  example,	  studying	  the	  congruency	  sequence	  effect	  naturally	  puts	  an	  emphasis	  on	  exploitative	  strategies	  (and	  modulations	  thereof).	  Similarly,	  task-­‐switching	  studies	  promote	  explorative	  behavior,	  and	  the	  AX-­‐CPT	  task	  focuses	  on	  anticipatory	  behavior.	  A	  key	  aspect	  of	  our	  proposal	  is	  that	  exploration	  and	  exploitation	  are	  not	  competitive	  modes,	  but	  rather	  two	  different	  cognitive	  control	  components.	  In	  most	  tasks,	  however,	  exploration	  is	  in	  competition	  with	  exploration	  (e.g.,	  gambling),	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  investigate	  one	  component	  irrespective	  of	  the	  other.	  One	  way	  to	  overcome	  this	  is	  a	  task	  where	  participants	  can	  voluntarily	  chose	  which	  task	  to	  perform,	  a	  flanker	  task,	  a	  Simon	  task	  or	  a	  Stroop	  task,	  in	  
which	  the	  relevant	  dimension	  always	  remains	  the	  same	  (color).	  This	  set	  up	  allows	  separate	  investigations	  of	  exploration	  (voluntary	  select	  another	  task)	  and	  exploitation	  (focus	  on	  task	  relevant	  information).	  	  	   Conclusion	  	  Many	  research	  teams	  are	  currently	  investigating	  the	  effects	  of	  reward	  on	  cognitive	  control.	  This	  has	  led	  to	  a	  substantial	  increase	  of	  interesting	  studies	  but	  not	  necessarily	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  how	  reward	  influences	  human	  behavior.	  Clearly,	  reward	  influences	  information	  processing	  in	  many	  different	  ways	  and	  subtle	  differences	  in	  design	  can	  make	  huge	  differences	  in	  results.	  Recently,	  researchers	  have	  recognized	  this	  problem	  (Braver	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Chiew	  and	  Braver,	  2011;	  Dreisbach	  &	  Fischer,	  2012)	  and	  first	  studies	  were	  set	  up	  to	  identify	  which	  experimental	  factors	  were	  crucial	  in	  modulating	  the	  effects	  (Braem	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Chiew	  and	  Braver,	  2014;	  Fröber	  and	  Dreisbach,	  2014).	  However,	  we	  believe	  that	  also	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  is	  needed.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  Berridge	  and	  Robinson’s	  parsing	  of	  reward	  components,	  we	  parsed	  three	  cognitive	  control	  components	  and	  linked	  each	  reward	  component	  to	  a	  control	  component.	  First,	  we	  argued	  that	  the	  hedonic	  effect	  of	  reward	  (positive	  mood)	  primarily	  influences	  the	  explorative	  component	  of	  control.	  Specifically,	  positive	  mood	  triggers	  people	  to	  search	  for	  opportunities	  and	  new	  rewards.	  Second,	  the	  learning	  effect	  of	  reward	  promotes	  the	  exploitative	  component	  of	  control.	  In	  fact,	  learning	  via	  reward	  and	  exploitation	  following	  successful	  performance	  might	  reflect	  one	  and	  the	  same	  process.	  Third	  and	  last,	  the	  motivational	  aspect	  of	  reward	  operates	  via	  the	  anticipatory	  control	  component,	  also	  called	  proactive	  control,	  which	  prepares	  the	  organism	  for	  what	  is	  to	  come.	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